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A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS
Sophia M. Robison*
o one would deny that the FBI performs a vital function in investigating, identifying, and tracking down suspects who may
endanger the life, liberty, and property of Americans.1 However, this
writer feels that the Uniform Crime Reports published by the FBI
should be subjected to a very critical analysis. Of primary concern are
the indiscriminate acceptance of the official data by legislators and
social science investigators and the doubtful inferences which a
frightened public draws from news releases proclaiming that "the
U.S. is sitting on a seething volcano of crime."2
To be sure, each official Uniform Crime Report includes a statement that the FBI is only a channel for the reports from police jurisdictions which agree to cooperate, and that it therefore cannot vouch
for the validity of the data. Additional qualifying statements to the
effect that the numerous causes of crime and variations in attendant
community conditions make it unwise to compare one jurisdiction
to another or one time period to another do not prevent the uninitiated reader from accepting· the figures at face value. The aura of
authenticity which accompanies a report issued under the seal of
the United States Government obscures for the observer unsophisticated in interpreting statistics the FBI's disclaimer of responsibility
for the accuracy of the data. Such disclaimers of responsibility for
the accuracy of the original data and the tendency of the FBI to
treat the Reports as though they were infallible violate the basic
requirements for sound inference and for scientific detachment
which one has the right to expect from a government agency.
The inciting incident which triggered this article was the writer's
unacademically phrased statement that "the F.B.I.'s figures are not
worth the paper they are printed on," which was made during a
telephone conversation with a New York Times reporter. In an unexpected press release the next day,3 the reporter quoted the writer
exactly and added comments expressed by other persons. Roy A.
Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, criticized the FBI breakdown of

N

• Professor Emeritus, School of Social Work, Columbia University.-Ed.
I. For an account of the origin and major responsibilities of the FBI, see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE STORY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (undated).
2. Newsday, Garden City, New York, Sept. 23, 1965, Center Section, p. _le.
3. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1965, p. 14.
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arrests into Negro and white; he was quoted as saying that "Negro
arrests, in the public mind, become Negro crimes."4 New York City's
Deputy Police Commissioner, Joseph G. Martin, who was in charge
of community relations, had no comment except the laconic statement that "the figures speak for themselves." 5 However, just as such
abstract concepts as democracy, freedom, and liberty do not convey
the same ideas to all persons, every sophisticated statistician knows
that figures do not speak for themselves.
Who can blame the "man in the street" if he is impressed by the
title in large letters, Crime in the United States, with the seal of
the United States Department of Justice? It is no wonder that he
is frightened by the Crime Capsules in the initial summary, which
convey the impression that serious crime is increasing at a greater
rate than the population and that juvenile crime is rising spectacularly. According to the Crime Capsules in the 1960 report:
[C]rime continued its upward surge, 14 percent over 1959. First
year of the sixties recorded a new all-time high, with 98 percent
more crime than in 1950. . . . Crime continued to outstrip
population growth over 4 to I. ... Arrests of persons under 18
more than doubled since 1950, while population of youths, ages
10-17, increased by less than one-half.6
According to the Crime Capsules in the 1964 report:
Arrests for all criminal acts, excluding traffic, increased 5 percent over 1963. For persons under 18 arrests up 17 percent....
National crime rate: 14 serious offenses per 1,000 inhabitants
in 1964.... Since 1958 crime has increased 6 times faster than
our population growth.7
Little wonder that the average citizen, even if he refers to the
entire report and not just to the press release, pays little attention to
the body of the report, which in addition to the seven "Index Crimes"
(in order of their seriousness: criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) lists a
much larger series-the "Arrest Series"-based on arrests for a
wide range of behavior (including assaults other than aggravated
assault, vandalism, carrying and possessing weapons, and vagrancy),
assumed to be less serious than the Index Crimes.
The public influence of the Reports is of course not limited to
their direct effect on the "man in the street"; the Reports' influence
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME

1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
7. 1964 REPORTS 1.

PORTS
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on the attitudes of the ·public press is also substantial. One can
hardly blame the newspaper reporter £or turning to official reports
when news is scarce and he is assigned to that hardy perennial, crime
and delinquency. After all, unlike subjects such as solid state physics,
Einstein's theories, or the wonders of the electro-magnetic tape,
crime is something about which nearly everyone has an opinion and
with which everyone thinks he has had some experience.

I.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS

It is important to keep in mind that the Reports were originated
with a view toward providing data which would help the police judge
their effectiveness in carrying out their responsibilities. In 1927 the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) assigned responsibility for establishing uniform crime records to an official committee. Under the direction of Bruce Smith, a well-known police
consultant and staff member of the Institute of Public Administration in New York City, and Lent D. Upson, of the Detroit Bureau
of Governmental Research, a complete manual for police entitled
Uniform Crime Reporting was published by the IACP. In 1930
Congress, after conferring with the Bureau of Prisons, assigned to
the FBI the responsibility for collecting the data according to the
manual and £or issuing reports. In recent years these reports have
been issued annually. Preliminary three-page quarterly reports containing current information are also published.
Shortly after Congress delegated this responsibility to the FBI,
Professor Warner commented that in light of the somewhat questionable source of the data, the Department of Justice might do more
harm than good by issuing the Reports, since this. material would
serve as a basis for influencing public opinion and legislation. 8 Professor Warner also made the incisive observation that "if the Federal
Government is to maintain its present reputation for the accuracy
of its statistics, it must stand by the slogan: 'Better no statistics, thm
false statistics!' " 9 In 1958, the FBI appointe<;I an advisory committee,
under the direction of Professor Peter P. Lejins, chairman of the
Department of Sociology at the University of Maryland, to report
on the validity of Thorsten Sellin's widely quoted comment about
national crime statistics: "The United States has the worst criminal
8. Warner, Crimes Known to the Police-An Index of Crime?, 45 HARv. L. REv.
207 (1921).
9. Id. at 220.
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statistics of any major country in the Western World." 10 The recommendations of that committee and the actions taken on them by the
FBI will be discussed later.
There will undoubtedly be more recommendations by President
Johnson's recently appointed United States Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice. If, however, these recommendations are based on inadequate statistics, they can hardly be
expected to result in more effective methods of control and prevention of crime than the admittedly ineffective methods in current
use.
In the following discussion, the writer has resisted the temptation to rework the FBI's statistics,11 because the published form of
the Reports makes it practically impossible to follow the data from
one series to the next (that is, offenses known to the police, clearances,
arrests, and final disposition) and to assess the use of estimates and
absolute numbers. Instead, an attempt will be made to review the
Reports of the past five years for answers to three questions which
appear to be crucial in appraising the statistics:
I: What is the source of the data?

2: What do the statistics mean?

,

3: How sound are the inferences drawn from the statistics?

Finally, specific suggestions for the improvement of the Uniform
Crime Reports will be made.
. II.

SOURCE OF THE DATA

The tw<J federal agencies which distribute national statistics on
crime and delinquency are the FBI and the Children's Bureau.
Neither agency assumes responsibility for the accuracy of the figures,
since both act only as intermediaries which compile data voluntarily
submitted by the local contributing agencies. It is essential also in
considering the validity of our crime and delinquency statistics to
bear in mind that, like our public school systems, our health services,
and our juvenile court procedures, the setup of our police services
is by no means uniform from state to state or even from community
to community within a single state. The doctrine of states' rights
and its sequel-the resistance to so-called federal control-is a peculiarly American phenomenon which impedes most attempts to secure
10. As quoted in Wallace, Crime in the United States, Life, SepL 9, 1957, p. 49.
11. For an admirable exposition of this approach, see Wolfgang, Uniform Crime
Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 708 (1963).
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nation-wide, or sometimes even state-wide, cooperation. Thus, because the individual states are autonomous in broad areas of politicar
and administrative responsibility, national data on the operations
of the police, which the central governments in some European
countries collect automatically, are not available for the United
States.
Recognizing the problems noted here, both the FBI and the
Children's Bureau have made continuous efforts to improve the
geographic coverage, accuracy, and completeness of the individual
reports. 12 An indication of the continuing efforts of the FBI to improve the geographic coverage of its statistics is the increase in the
number of letters and visits. In 1959 the Bureau sent out 4,500 letters
to local reporting officials, asking questions about details of their
reports and offering assistance in making the reports conform to
the required procedures outlined in the official manual. In 1964
more than 19,000 letters were written, and hundreds ·of personal
visits were made by specially trained FBI officers.
The following discussion is an account of what happens in New
York City, where the reporting procedure is fairly typical of large
metropolitan areas. Citizens' reports of criminal activity may be made
either to a central police headquarters or to the local police precinct.
If such a report is made to headquarters, it is transferred immediately
to the appropriate precinct. Each complaint receives a serial number.
If the situation warrants an investigation, the complaint is assigned
to a detective who is required to report his findings within seventytwo hours. Monthly summary reports are prepared in the precinct
offices and forwarded to the city headquarters, which in turn transmits them to Washington and to the New York State Department of
Correction. The New York City office, like other large metropolitan
centers, has the advantage of computers and other data processing
equipment in its Statistics and Records Bureau.
In Philadelphia during the interval between 1951 and 1953 the
local reports showed a seventy per cent increase in serious offenses.
This apparent increase in the numbers of crimes was not the result
of an invasion of the city by criminals; it was the consequence of a
failure in 1951 of one police district in the center of the city to include five thousand complaints in its report. On the basis of the revised reports, the actual increase was found to be thirty per cent for
12. For a description of the improvements in the reporting procedures of the
United States Children's Bureau, see ROBISON, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS NATURE AND
CONTROL 17•18 (1960). .
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the three-year period. The city's installation of a central reporting
system in 1953 has presumably improved the reliability of its crime
reports.13
As may have been the case in the Philadelphia incident, underreporting may reflect a feeling of obligation on the part of the police
to protect the reputation of their department and their city. Cressey
notes that when this goal cannot be accomplished under the existing
legal and administrative machinery, it may be done with statistics.14
In a series of articles on crime in ·a Long Island daily,10 this
:writer's remark that the FBI statistics "are not worth the paper they
are written on" was quoted. A recently retired New York City police
officer, incensed at the comment, sent this ·writer a letter. The letter
began with a paean of praise for Mr. Hoover. The officer assumed
that the criticism of the FBI statistics implied that crime was actually
less prevalent than the published statistics indicated. He referred
to the refusal by the FBI to accept New York City's crime statistics
for the years 1948 to 1952-because, in his terms, "they were so
badly juggled." Despite the setting up of a new system, however,
the retired officer claimed that the New York City statistics have again
hit the depths in "covering up." In other words, he validated the
premise of this article that the data are really nonrepresentative of
the crime picture, either currently or comparatively. He stated:
There's a very famous detective who works in every station house
in N.Y.C. His name is detective "Can" and that's where all the
reported crimes go whenever possible ..... I've consigned hundreds of cases to detective "Can." You don't do this to get out
of doing your job, but rather to keep the "squeal rate" down
·and make the boss look good and this goes on right up to the
P.C. [police captain].
The ... [precinct] ... is a masterpiece of statistics juggling.
The Capt. wouldn't last two days ... if every crime was entered
on the UF 61 sheet that was reported in person or on the phone.
I was present one night when the Captain of the . . . [precinct] ... said, "Don't put in any more burglaries for the rest
of the month." ... [I]t was then about the 25th or 26th of the
month. If a crime (burglary) is not covered by insurance, it
seldom gets entered as a burglary, but rather as petit larceny or
malicious mischief (damage to door). If it's covered by insurance
then it has to go in as is.16
13. See BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 138 (1959).
14. See Cressey, The State of Criminal Statistics, 3 J, NAT'L PROBATION &: PAROLE
Ass'N 231 (July 1957).
15. Newsday, Garden City, New York, Sept. 23, 1965, Center Section, p. le.
16. Widespread practices of the type discussed in this letter have recently come to
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In a personal conversation granted at the writer's request, the
officer reiterated that he believed his comments represented a. consensus of the officers in other precincts. He stated that if the complainant was not covered by insurance, the possibility of the complaint's going into the "can" file was great. There was a tendency also
to scale down the complainant's estimate of the amount of loss, even
if it was covered by insurance.
He further commented on the difficulty that a detective might
experience in carrying out the assignment for immediate investigation .. Detectives work in three shifts, and, as Mr. Mills has pointed
out, 17 the police officer may postpone some tasks which require his
appearance in court at inconvenient times or encroach on his leisure
time.
No doubt other police officers could add their testimony as to
the practices which affect the recording of crime. At this point it
would seem that there is sufficient testimony to suggest the exercise
of caution in taking the FBI's published statistics at "face value."
Further criticism of the statistics will be postponed until after
an evaluation of the data to answer the second question-what do
the figures stand for?
III. MEANING

OF

THE FBI STATISTICS

There is a generally accepted assumption that acts reported to
the police provide an appropriate basis for judging not only the ·
total amount of crime but also the relative incidence and importance
of specific types of criminal activity. In this regard, the primary
distinction made by the FBI is based on the degree of seriousness
of particular types of criminal acts. Since 1959 the crimes formerly
designated "Part I Offenses," which are assumed to be the most
serious, have been labeled "Index Crimes." They are subclassified
in descending order of seriousness as follows:
the attention of high police officials in New York City, and measures are being taken
in an attempt to ensure more accurate reporting of police statistics in the future.
See N.Y. Times, April 5, 1966, p. I, cols. 2-3; p. 28, cols. 5-8:
Chief Inspector Sanford D. Garelik, who put out the order calling for better
statistics, declared at the time that "self-serving" officials had tended to report
crime in their jurisdictions as being less serious than it really was.
High police officers said yesterday that burglaries had sometimes been "canned"
. (not recorded in police statistics) or had been recorded as petty larceny or lost
property. Similarly, they said, robbery complaints had sometimes been downgraded
to petty larceny or disorderly conduct.
17. Mills, The Detective, Life, Nov. 26, 1965, pp. 90D-123.
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Crimes Against The Person
I. Criminal Homicide
a. Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter
b. Negligent manslaughter
·
2. Forcible rape
3. Robbery
4. Aggravated Assault
Crimes Against Property
5. Burglary
6. Larceny
Larceny of property valued at $50 or more
b. Larceny of property valued at less. than $50
7. Automobile theft

a.

The Arrest Series, formerly known as "Part II Offenses," is
comprised of less serious offenses. This category includes approximately twenty offenses beginning alphabetically with arson and
ending with "weapons; carrying, possessing, etc."
It is essential to understand that the basis of the count in the
two series differs. For the Index Crimes, offenses known to the
police are the recorded units, and thus at the time of reporting
there is no indication as to how many persons may have been
involved in the criminal transaction. Furthermore, some of these
persons may have been involved in other offenses during the course
of the year which is covered by the Report. In contrast, the Arrest
Series is based on arrests of persons who have been charged with any
of the offenses relegated to that series.
The Arrest Series offers the only available base for estimating the
relative number of individuals involved in crimes listed under
either series, but unfortunately the number of cities or agencies
reporting differs not only from year to year but also from tabulation
to tabulation. Disregarding these limitations, one can infer that
among the four offenses designated by the Index series as crimes
against the person, criminal homicide is credited with the highest
percentage of clearance by arrest-approximately ninety per cent.18
Aggravated assault is second with about a seventy-five per cent clearance rate. In marked contrast, the highest percentage of clearance
among the three Index Crimes against property is assigned to robbery
(approximately forty per cent),10 and the lowest clearance rate is
18. 1963 REPORTS 21 (chart 8).
19. Ibid.
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ascribed to larceny (nventy per cent).20 In each of the years studied,
the less serious crimes accounted for approximately eighty-five per
cent of the total arrests.
It should be obvious by now that to attempt to follow the raw
data of the FBI reports from one stage to another presents a severe
challenge to one's frustration tolerance.
A. Specific Definitions and Incidence of Selected Index Crimes
A general discussion of each of the seven Index Crimes would
carry this article beyond its intended scope. In addition, more
benefit may be derived by concentrating on the definitions and
incidence of homicide, burglary, larceny, and automobile theft.

I. Criminal homicide.-(a) Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter: all willful felonious, homicides as distinguished
from deaths caused by negligence. Excludes attempts to
kill, assaults to kill, suicides, accidental deaths, or justifiable
homicides.... (b) Manslaughter by negligence: any death
which the police investigation establishes was primarily
attributable to gross negligence of some individual other
than the victim. 21
Criminal homicide is designated as the most serious of the Index
Crimes. The totals for this crime (murder and nonnegligent manslaughter only) rose from 8,583 offenses in 1959 to 9,249 in 1964;22
the lowest figure was 8,404 in 1962.23 However, ·criminal homicide
has never accounted for more than one half of one per cent of the
total Index Crimes, and in 1964 this offense comprised only 0.35 per
cent of the total. 24
2. Burglary-breaking or entering.-Burglary, housebreaking,
safecracking, or any unlawful entry to commit a felony or a
theft, even though no force was used to gain entrance and
attempts. Burglary followed by larceny is not counted again
as larceny.25

In marked contrast to criminal homicide, the FBI totals for
burglary increase from 685,862 in 1959 to 1,110,458 in 1964.26
However, stated as a percentage of total Index Crimes, the incidence
20,
21,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Ibid.
Id. at 43.
1959 REPORTS
1962 REPORTS
1964 REPoRTS
1963 REPORTS
1959 REPORTS

34 (table
35 (table
50 (table
44.
35 (table

2); 1964
2).
2).

REPORTS

51 (table 2).

2); 1964

REPORTS

51 (table ~).
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of this offense remained practically the same-43.1 per cent in 1959
and 42.6 per cent in 1964.27
3. Larceny-theft (except auto theft).-(a) Fifty dollars and
over in value; (b) under $50 in value. Thefts of bicycles,
automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or any
stealing of property or article of value which is not taken
by force and violence or by fraud. Excludes embezzlement,
"con" games, forgery, worthless checks, etc.28
The totals for larceny (fifty dollars and over in value) increased
from 403,426 in 1959 to 704,536 in 1964.29 However, as in the case
of burglary, the relative increase in larcenies was very slight-from
25 per cent of the total Index Crimes in 1959 to 27 per cent in
1964.30 .
4. Auto theft.-Stealing or driving away and abandoning a
motor _vehicle. Excludes taking for temporary use when
actually returned by the taker or unauthorized use by those
having lawful access to the vehicle.81
The number of automobile thefts increased from 288,337 in
1959 to 462,971 in 1964,82 representing 12 per cent of the total
Index Crimes in 1959 and 17 per cent in 1964.38
Using the latest figures, those for 1964, it appears that the three
crimes against property (burglary, larceny, and auto theft) account
for approximately seven eighths of all the Index Crimes.

B. Inconsistencies in the Labeling Procedure
Although the above captions-criminal homicide, robbery, larceny, and auto theft-may appear to the unwary reader to be mutually exclusive, there is no assurance that either these or the other
• offense categories are always uniformly applied. Some of the inconsistencies are the result of occasional changes in procedure, and others
are related to the factor of discretion in applying the labels. An
example of the difficulty caused by changes in procedure may be
found in the current trend toward discarding customary legal terms,
such as felony and misdemeanor, and substituting more specific
and descriptive categories, such as the ones described above. Some
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

1959
1963
1959
1959
1963
1959
1959

REPORTS
REPORTS
REPORTS
REPORTS
REPORTS
REPORTS
REPORTS

34-35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 50-51 (table 2).
44.
35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 51 (table 2).
34-35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 50-51 (table 2).
44.
35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 51 (table 2).
34-35 (table 2); 1964 REPORTS 50-51 (table 2).
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jurisdictions, such as New York City, still use the terms interchangeably.
With respect to the second source of inconsistency, discretionary
labeling, there is, unfortunately, no assurance that all jurisdictions
affix the same labels to similar offenses. For example, drunkenness
is sometimes regarded as disorderly conduct or vagrancy. Moreover,
the directions in the FBI police manual specify that only the most
serious offense committed during the course of a single criminal
transaction can be listed for tabulation. Thus, a situation involving
aggravated assault combined with burglary must be recorded as
simply a case of aggravated assault. It should be evident that this
procedure may easily obscure the severity of the criminal behavior,
as does the process in some jurisdictions of persuading defendants
to plead guilty to a lesser offense in situations where several criminal
acts were committed.
An additional element of imprecision in the labeling procedure
is created by the use of a catch-all category for miscellaneous offenses.
This vague classification is particularly distressing to sophisticated
statisticians. A final, and perhaps even more indefensible, practice is
the inclusion of "attempted" criminal acts in each of the categories
without indicating the number of occurrences.

C. Incompleteness of the Reports

In addition to the foregoing variations in the application of
labels, another weakness of the Reports is a result of the numerous
categories of ·wrongdoing which are either wholly or partially
omitted from the FBI statistics. In. this regard, it should be noted
that the FBI statistics do not include violations of federal laws.
A more important omission, however, is the large category of picturesquely named "white collar" crimes. Professor Sutherland has
published a documented study in which he discusses the widely
adopted practices for handling such obviously antisocial acts as
misrepresentation in advertising, restraint of trade, and manipulation of prices and markets, so that persons in the upper socioeconomic strata will not acquire police records. 34 Moreover, if the
complainant in such cases decides to go to court, the proceedings
are ordinarily conducted in civil rather than criminal courts. Clinard
34. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLI.AR CRIME (1949). Similarly, although the defendants
in the recent electrical equipment conspiracies were charged with criminal offenses,
the unlawful activities involved in those cases will not be included in the Reports.
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discusses another form of antisocial behavior which is not reflected
in the Reports-the defiance of wartime administrative regulations.81s
Like the "business crimes" of well-to-do corporate executives,
the antisocial behavior of youths from privileged communities is
rarely labeled as criminal activity. On the occasions when such conduct does receive the attention of public officials, any resulting
judicial proceedings are frequently dismissed, as the news reports
of last year's incidents in Darien, Connecticut, and Newport, Rhode
Island, illustrate. Similar behavior by youths who live on the wrong
side of the tracks, especially if they belong to minority groups, is
much more likely to "result in a police report and some form of
punishment. To the statement, rarely does the rich man go to jail
or hang, can be added-rarely does his son or daughter appear in
FBI or Children's Bureau statistics.
Hidden delinquency, which has received very little attention
from public officials, is another type ·of omission from official crime
statistics. If the community's concern is not confined merely to
punishing criminals who are ultimately caught, attention should
also be directed to the incidence of unlabeled, hidden delinquency
and crime whose perpetrators have succeeded in overcoming their
youthful transgressions and are currently leading useful lives in
the community.
A preliminary report of the exploratory phase of the Career Pat•
terns Project, which retraces the youthful careers of a cross-section
of currently respectable males between the ages of thirty and sixty,
reveals that three fourths of them acknowledged behavior which
could have earned them an official label of delinquent or criminal.86
Personal interviews with these subjects have yielded data on family,
school, occupation, and leisure time relationships. The objective
is to identify the crucial combination of factors associated with the
occurrence and disappearance of antisocial behavior. The preliminary findings of these studies were sufficiently challenging to suggest
further and more intensive studies on larger samples. Even more
important, no information of this type is currently contained in the
FBI's statistical reports.
In brief, the answer to the question as to the meaning of the
statistics is that the FBI's definitions of specific crimes are neither
uniformly applied nor sufficiently inclusive.
35. See CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET-A STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1952).
36. See Robison & Levine, The Adolescent Behavior of the Currently Respectable
Male-A Study of the Youthful Delinquent Behavior of Men Who Today Are Respectable Members of Society, Nat'l Institute of Mental Health, Grants 0M78l•
MH00781-03, Oct. 1961-Dec. 1964 (March 1965).
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VALIDITY OF THE INFERENCES DRAWN BY THE FBI

FROM ITS STATISTICS

To continue the critical review, answers are needed not only
to the first ~vo questions concerning the source and meaning of the
statistics, but also to the third question, regarding the validity of
the inferences which are drawn from these figures.
In a letter of transmittal dated September 29, 1958, Dr. Lejins,
speaking for the Advisory Committee on Uniform Crime Reporting,
which was composed of himself, Dr. Charlton F. Chute, Director of
the Institute of Public Administration in New York City, and Stanley R. Schrotel, Chief of Police at Cincinnati, Ohio, stated that the
Uniform Crime Reporting Program is "the most important segment
of the nationwide criminal statistics published in the United States."87
Dr. Lejins also noted that time limits restricted the scope of the
Advisory Committee's inquiry to "considering certain specific issues
which were of primary concern to the staff engaged in the production of the Reports." 38 Preceding and following the official report of
the Advisory Committee, critics of the Reports raised questions and
made comments. Primarily sociologists and criminologists and an occasional magazine writer or executive of a state welfare commission,
these critics expressed concern with respect to the .following subjects:
classification and designation of crimes on the basis of their seriousness, official statements about juvenile crime, the basis for calculation
of crime rates, and the use of "crime clocks.". The following discussion will relate these comments, where appropriate, to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and to the subsequent action
taken by the FBI.
A. Classification on the Basis of Seriousness

A great deal of criticism has been directed at the Bureau's classification of crimes according to an estimate of the seriousness of the
conduct involved. We have already touched upon three aspects of
such a designation: lack of clarity in definition, lack of uniformity
in applying labels, and the Bureau's rule that only one crime (in
order of the established hierarchy) committed during the course of
a transaction may be used as the basis for tabulation. 39 Furthermore,
such offenses as arson, kidnapping, and assault and battery, which
are excluded from the Index Crimes, may in fact involve more per37• .ADVISORY COMM. ON UNIFORM CRIME RECORDS, INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF Pouc:e,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 8 (Special Issue 1958).
38. Ibid.
39. See discussion in section III(B) supra.
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sonal injury than rape, aggravated assault, or some of the crimes
against property which are included in the Index. The validity of
this assertion is borne out by the results of a special study conducted
by Sellin and Wolfgang to investigate a large sample of offenses
known to the Philadelphia police in 1960.40 The objective of the
study was to provide a sounder basis for classifying crimes than the
one currently being used by the Uniform Crime Reporting Program.
With respect to several of the categories of crime, erroneous
impressions have been created about the significance of the Index
Crimes, either as a result of faulty classification or as a result of
unrealistic calculation of the rate of incidence of the crimes. In this
regard, the categories of automobile theft and murder are particularly misleading.
The Advisory Committee, in discussing the category of automobile thefts, suggested that a distinction be made between borrowing a car for a joyride, the usual juvenile offense, and stealing a
car for a getaway from the scene of a crime or for stripping and
resale, which are likely to be adult offenses. It is reported that the
FBI did not accept this suggestion because it was felt that there is
no reason to distinguish between these acts, since any unpermitted
taking deprives a person of the use of his property, even if only for
a short period of time. In addition, the Bureau felt that a system
of separate classification might encourage the juvenile crime of
joyriding.
Fear of death by murder is undoubtedly increased by the FBI reports and news releases. In this respect, certain misconceptions about
the situation in New York City are of special interest. Police reports
for the year 1964 contradict the popular theory that most murders in
New York are committed by strangers running rampant in the streets.
Almost two thirds of the 637 murders reported in that year took
place indoors. 41 In about one fourth of these cases, the slayer was
in some way "related" to the victim-most often a common-law
wife or husband.42 The second largest group of intra-family slayings
involved parents who murdered their sons or daughters.4B
An internationally recognized authority recently made the comforting disclosure that criminal homicide is not increasing but is
actually on the decrease. James V. Bennett, former director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and chairman of the United Nations Con-

40.

See SllLLIN &: WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF
41. See N.Y. Times, April 12, 1965, p. 28, col, 5.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
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ference on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held
in London in 1960, stated:
In the past thirty-odd years, the homicide rate has been cut
nearly in half, dropping from 8.9 per 100,000 of our civilian
population in 1930 to 5.1 in 1962.... The actual number of
homicides declined for a time from the 10,500 that were recorded in 1930, and later rose again. In 1962 the total reached
only 9,500 although the population had increased 50 percent
since 1930. We may conclude that the life of the ordinary citizen is a good deal safer than it used to be-despite the contrary
impression created by headlines. 44
To counteract the current justifiable objections to the designation of the present Index crimes as the most serious forms of criminal
activity, the Advisory Committee suggested a new three-part classification: (1) a general tabulation of offenses which are recorded as they
become known to the police, (2) offenses used for the purposes of the
Crime Index, and (3) offenses that are singled out as being at the
given time of special importance to the police departments in their
work.
B. Statements About Juvenile Crimes

In spite of the FBI's acknowledgment that its coverage of juvenile
crimes is incomplete, that there is overlapping with other jurisdictions, and that the police handling of juvenile offenders differs
widely in different communities, practically all the FBI reports
emphasize the increasing incidence of crime in the juvenile population. An example of the emphasis upon juvenile crime can be seen
in the following New York Times headline, which was a direct
quotation from an FBI news release: "Youths Charged witli Nearly
Half Major Crimes in '57, the FBI Reports." 45 This· headline conveyed the erroneous impression that half the murders, thefts, burglaries, and aggravated assaults were attributable to juveniles. It is
interesting to note that a commentator for The New Yorker questioned the method of averaging percentage :figures, on which the
inference of the startling headline was based.46 Subsequently, the
Advisory Committee took special notice of this article in The New
Yorker and explained that the misinterpretation of the headline
was due to failure to refer to the FBI's complete annual report. How44. Bennett, A Cool Look at "The Crime Crisis," in A Special Supplement of Harper's on Crime and Punishment, Harper's, April 1964, pp. 123-24.
45. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1958, p. 1.
46. The New Yorker, May 3, 1958, p. I.
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ever, no mention of the qualifying statements which appear in the
annual bulletin had been included in the news release.
A recently retired executive of Iowa's Commission on Children
and Youth wrote the following comments criticizing the emphasis
which the Reports place upon juvenile delinquency:
Wide publicity was given to the statement that . . . 50% of
all major crimes were committed by juveniles, and we knew
flatly and emphatically that it was not so.... Even the State
Attorney General was making speeches in which he used the
F.B.I. figures, and so were youth directors of religious education
of the major religious denominations.47
This critic also called attention to the hazards of attempting
to make sweeping statements about juvenile delinquency in view
of the differing jurisdictions of the police and the juvenile courts
and the concomitant variations in designating conduct as criminal or
delinquent. In Iowa, only the general term "delinquency" is used;
specific offenses cannot be charged in the juvenile court.
C. Basis for Calculation of Rates
The two most frequently mentioned criticisms of the Reports
relate to the geographic areas involved and the population at risk.
After considering the criticism of the FBI's selection of certain
geographic units as reporting districts, the Advisory Committee
recommended the use of tabulations by state and size of city. In
addition, the Committee suggested that the FBI should follow the
United States Census Bureau's scheme, which takes account of the
increasing movements of population from farms to cities and from
core cities to surrounding urban areas. The FBI accepted this recommendation, and currently tabulates figures in three categories:
standard metropolitan statistical areas, urban communities (with
more than 2,500 inhabitants), and rural areas.
The second persistent criticism involves the population base
used in calculating the rates. Demographers emphasize the necessity
of considering the actual population at risk. For example, in calculating birth rates, the base figure for the crude rate is the number
of women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four. Further
breakdowns consider current sociological concepts and such characteristics as age at marriage, marital status, religious affiliation, ethnic
group, education, and the availability and use of contraceptives, all
of which appear to be associated with family size. Similarly, to
47. Personal communication to the author.
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describe the taxonomy of the various forms of crime in more meaningful ways would require implementation of the changes suggested
below.
There should be a revision in the method for calculating rates
for the "under eighteen" and "over eighteen" age gr_oups included
in the current FBI statistics. Criminal jurisdiction starts where
juvenile court jurisdiction ends, and the line of demarcation varies
from state to state. In some states age sixteen is the dividing line,
and in others it may be seventeen, eighteen, or occasionally as high
as twenty. Moreover, the upper age limit varies for males and
females in some courts. Since the sex distribution in both crime and
delinquency statistics reveals a markedly lower incidence of females
engaged in criminal activity, except in the categories of sex offenses
such as prostitution, and some forms of larceny, such as shoplifting,
the rates should be standardized not only for age but for sex as well.
Another improvement in the utility of the Reports could be
achieved if the criteria for the appropriate age to begin assigning
criminal responsibility to a juvenile's acts corresponded more fully
than it does at present to periods in the youth's life span when
changes in his socio-legal status may affect his behavior responses.
"Adulthood" in reference to military status and voting is relatively
uniform throughout the country. However, the minimum age for
obtaining a marriage license or driving license or the age at which
liquor may be purchased is not uniform in the various states.
In spite of the FBI's adoption of some of the recommendations
of the Advisory Committee with respect to geographic areas and the
use of census data, 48 there is general agreement among critics, both
official and unofficial, that the basis for calculating crime rates used
in the Reports still needs major revision.
D. Use of Crime Clocks

The crime clock is a special graphic device which each of the
FBI reports includes to indicate the comparative incidence of Index
Crimes. In 1964, in the category of crimes against the person, the
crime clock registered one murder every hour, one robbery, every
five minutes, and one aggravated assault every three minutes. In the
category of crimes against property, the clock registered one burglary every twenty-eight seconds, one larceny (fifty dollars and over)
every forty-five seconds, and one automobile theft every minute.
48. The Advisory Committee criticized the use of the decennial census figures in
intercensal years. Their recommendation to substitute the available annual estimates
by the Bureau of the Census was followed.
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The crime clock device is intended to dramatize the prevalence
of serious crime. However, the calculations ignore the population
at risk. Since the base figures cover an entire year, the numbers of
offe_nses should be divided by 365 days to represent the chances that
any one person would be at risk ·of murder, assault, robbery, or any
other crime in any one community on any day. Utilizing this method,
rough calculations for murder in 1964 suggest that in the country
as a whole, the chance of being murdered on any given day is approximately one in two million. All reports indicate that there is
much more chance of death by automobile accident than by murder.
In brief, the inferences drawn by the FBI from its statistics are
open to serious doubt. The most authoritative criticisms were made
by the Advisory Committee with respect to the FBI's distinction between major and minor crime. The apparent overemphasis on juvenile crime in the FBI's news releases is deplored by persons familiar
with local situations. As mentioned above, it was explained by the
Advisory Committee as failure to take into consideration qualifying
statements which, unfortunately, do not appear in the press releases.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE REPORTS

If its statistics are to be "worth the paper they are ·written on,"
the FBI must resolve a three-horned dilemma by satisfying in one
document the needs of the police, the demands of the general public,
and the concern of scholars seeking to understand social deviance.
The FBI's first allegiance is logically to the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, under whose auspices the present Uniform Crime
Reporting program was _devised. Its second audience is the general
public, which through payment of taxes provides the funds for the
FBI's operation. The public is concerned with the effectiveness of
the police in protecting life, limb, and property. The third audience
is composed of representatives of the disciplines of law, social science,
and social welfare, and this group is interested in the relevance of
the published data to the understanding, control, and prevention of
various forms of deviant behavior. To meet the realistic needs of
each of these three quite different interests, the following suggestions
are offered regarding the form and tenor of future Uniform Grime
Reports.
A. Suggestions for Improving the Form of the Reports

The first suggestion for improving the form of the Reports relates to geographic coverage. According to the explanatory comments
in the 1964 Reports, ninety-seven per cent of the larger cities, slightly

April 1966]

Critical View of the UCRs

1049

less than ninety per cent of the other cities, and approximately
seventy-five per cent of the rural areas are represented. The fu_ture
push, therefore, should be to persuade more of the rural police jurisdictions to contribute data.
The discussion above concerning the current units of count reveals lack of uniformity in applying labels49 as well as ·omissions,
such as the so-called "white collar" crimes.50 Similarly, the present
basis for distinguishing benveen serious and non-serious crime is
somewhat ~nsound. To correct these deficiencies, it is suggested that
Sellin and Wolfgang's design for a crime index merits consideration.
The hypothesis underlying their scheme is that the present crime
categories in the Reports conceal the important data about the incidence and severity of criminal acts. In their opinion, the important
variable is_ the "event," that is, the "content" of a crimina1 act and
the actors committing it rather than its legal label. Their carefully
designed manual provides instructions and examples of procedures
in designating single or combined "events." The manual also contains a sample score sheet which explains how to weight the seriousness of the "events."
Sellin and Wolfgang also advocate other changes in the present
procedure. First, they recommend excluding from the Reports all
consensual offenses, all criminal activity in which both parties do
their best to conceal the behavior (blackmail, narcotic violations,
gambling, most sex offenses, and criminal abortion), and offenses
against the public which are discovered only by the activities of the
police, such as vagrancy and prostitution. The second major recommendation is to base the Crime Index on arrests rather than. the
current standard of offenses known to the police. The rationale for
this substitution is that until an arrest is made for at least one violation of a criminal law, we have no definitive information about the
facts of the occurrence and the characteristics of the person or persons
involved. 51
The foregoing suggestions are not offered as a means for developing an index of crime in general, but rather as a better basis for
judging the changes over time in the content and volume of serious
crime.

B. Recommendations for the Tenor of Future Reports
As the Advisory Committee noted, the needs of the FBI and
police departments should not alone determine the content of the
49. See discussion in section III(B) supra.
50. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
51. See SELLIN &: WOLFGANG, op. cit. supra note 40:
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Reports. 52 In fact, the Committee found that there is ·a regrettable
amount of misinterpretation each time the Reports are released,
causing unnecessary concern to private and public agencies and to
individuals about "imaginary problems." 53
In this writer's opinion the misinterpretations occur because
the publications, instead of being an objective presentation of the
data, serve as a springboard for frightening the public and blaming
legal restrictions for failure to prevent further criminal activity
once the police have apprehended the culprits. Specifically, the first
message of the Reports to the general public is that people are in
greater danger than ever before of death from physical attack. However, as noted in earlier sections of this discussion, 54 the statistics
themselves do not validate such statements. Traffic accidents, especially when the driver is under the ·influence of liquor, offer more
hazards to life and limb. The current legislative efforts to promote
safer cars and safer drivers reflect recognition of this fact. The second
message to the public is that the police cannot perform their protective function effectively because "due process" excludes pre-trial
evidence obtained by the police. From the point of view of the police,
this means that culprits are frequently released to continue their
evil ways.
The following statement is an example of the language often
found in the Reports:
For the law enforcement officer the time-proven deterrents to
crime are sure detection, swift apprehension and proper punishment. Each is a necessary ingredient. . .. The professional law
enforcement officer is convinced from experience that the hardened criminal has been and is deterred from killing based on
the prospect of the death penalty. 55
However, at least one piece of evidence to the contrary was the
necessity in England of ceasing the practice of hanging convicted
pickpockets in public, because other pickpockets deftly plied their
trade among the onlookers gaping at the bodies swinging from the
gallows.
In the attempts of the police to deal with crime, pronouncements
such as those quoted above, irrespective of good intentions, suggest
that the police are usurping the functions of the judicial and sociological disciplines by dealing with criminal activity in its social
52. ADVISORY COMM. ON UNIFORM CRIME RECORDS, op. cit. supra note 37, at 13.
53. Ibid.
54. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
55. 1959 REPORTS 14.
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rather than its individual aspects. However, a concerted attack on
overt forms of social deviance in our fast-changing, multi-ethnic
society requires the understanding and the appropriate functioning
not only of the police as the front line of defense, but also of the
judges, lawyers, sociologists, and social work practitioners both in
and out of court.

VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In addition to the foregoing suggestions concerning the form
and tenor of the Reports, we must consider the factors which condition the nature of communication between the three audiences of the
Reports and any reasonable steps to improve this communication.
The police are the first link in the chain of events on which the
Reports are based. Whether the police are notified that an offense
has occurred, or whether they are witnesses to its occurrence or are
called upon to deal with an offender who is caught in the act, the
action which a police officer takes is the initial force which may
lead to an arrest and a finding of guilt. To use the terminology of
the classic Greek drama, the four characters in the drama are the
accuser, the accused, the victim and the "chorus," in the form of the
public. Three factors determine how effectively a policeman will
play this initial role: the police officer's image of himself, the public's
image of the police, and the suspect's image of the police.
A police officer's image of himself and his role is based upon a
complex set of factors involving his basic character structure, his
personality needs, his class orientation, and his evaluation of the
demands and attitudes of those who make the laws and man the
courts. The challenge to a police officer is to reconcile these often
conflicting needs with his behavior vis-a-vis a suspect. Frequently the
behavior of a police officer toward a suspect depends on whether the
suspect is a member of the "ruling class" or a member of a minority
group living in a ghetto. In the former case the officer will be very
careful how he proceeds to label a suspect who can afford to protect
himself with legal counsel. On the other hand, in the latter case
the suspect is usually unaware that he should make no statements
which might incriminate him, and he is much more likely to resist
the police, whom he thinks of only as "the enemy."
The image of the police as "the unscrupulous enemy" is almost
universal among suspects who are predominantly, as Judge David
Bazelon has said, "from the bottom of the socio-economic-cultural
barrel-from among the ignorant, the ill-educated, the unemployed
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and often unemployable.'' 56 All too often the resistive behavior of
such suspects activates the hostility of the police, and a vicious cycle
is likely to end with the suspects being labeled as criminals.
The hostility of the public, and specifically minority group suspects, toward the police probably derives in part from experiences
with behavior of some police officers which does not accord with
common standards of honesty and fairness. Cincinnati's Police Chief
Stanley Schrotel, who is also a member of the Advisory Committee,
has stated that "the image of the policeman as a totalitarian influence
in society must be dispelled.... This dispelling is entirely up to us
policemen." 57 In Cincinnati, a policeman who uses any force at all
in making an arrest must appear with the arrested person before a
supervisor to explain what happened and why force was necessary.
There are three ways in which the tarnished image of the police
may be changed, with a resulting improvement in their status and
performance. The first recommendation involves instituting a better
selection process which will weed out candidates for a police force
whose personality needs include "throwing their weight around."
Currently, police officers are told to "check their tempers," but it
might be better to eliminate from the force those officers who have
uncontrollable tempers. The second recommendation is to raise the
formal educational requirements for police officers, and the third
recommendation is to establish better salary scales and promotion
policies. Together these changes would undoubtedly improve the
public image of the police and raise police morale and performance
in both the detection and the prevention of crime.
Public apathy and public carelessness contribute to the "volcano
of crime," to use the FBI's characterization of the present situation.
The extent of offenses against property-burglary, larceny, and
automobile theft, which according to the Reports account for eighty
to ninety per cent of all offenses-may in part be a reflection of the
public's role in failing to provide ordinary precautions to protect
its property at home, in the office, or on the street. Automobiles are
frequently borrowed qr stolen because the owners do not take precautions to lock their cars or to conceal their baggage, which may be
a temptation for the thief. An educational program to correct these
tendencies was outlined in a paper presented at a meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. 68
56. Address by Judge David L. Bazelon, Law and Order Without Justice, delivered
Feb. 22, 1966 at the New York Civil Liberties Union Award Luncheon.
57. See Bowen, Crime in the Cities: An Unnecessary Crisis, Fortune, Dec. 1965,
pp. 141, 142.
58. FooNER, THE CARELEss AMERICAN: A STUDY IN AnVEN11TIOUS CRIMINALITY (196!1),
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A new approach to crime prevention by the police has been
adopted by the city of Chicago with the support of Mayor Richard
Daley. Police Chief Orlando W. Wilson (formerly Dean of the School
· of Criminology of the University of California) emphasizes "aggressive
preventive patrol." 59 Since he believes that the core function of the
police is not to arrest criminals but rather to prevent crime, he has
increased the number of patrol cars. In order to expedite the reporting of criminal activity, he has installed what is regarded as the most
advanced police communication system in the world. His program
is an excellent illustration of what can be done to help the metropolitan police perform their job more effectively and, incidentally,
to achieve recognition for it from the public.
The third audience of the Reports, which is composed of criminologists, sociologists, and social welfare practitioners, . seeks data
which will help ferret out the factors associated with the occurrence
of crime and which will indicate the characteristics of the labeled or
unlabeled culprit. In their opinion, these data are necessary to appraise the effect of the apprehending and treatment procedures with
respect to both the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection
of society.
Unfortunately, neither the form nor the content of the Reports
makes any provision for the two antecedent conditions for a scientific
approach to understanding and dealing effectively with crime. The
major gap is the absence of a logical taxonomy and a set of tenable
hypotheses. To guide the FBI in collecting relevant statistical data,
this writer suggests the appointment of an advisory committee composed of representatives of the sociological, criminological, and social
welfare practitioners in this field. The first task of such a committee
would be to propose hypotheses of cause, cure, and prevention and
to identify them with respect to their relevance to various levels
of theory. The second task would be to test these hypotheses for
feasibility in the light of the FBI's available financial and personnel
resources. The third step would be to determine the relevant data
and to articulate operational definitions.
It is to be hoped that Attorney General Katzenbach's Commission
will, as Judge Bazelon suggests, 60 resist the pressure from members
of various legal associations for more stringent law enforcement,
especially against disadvantaged minority groups: Judge Bazelon
apparently agrees with Professor Herbert Wechsler, who, speaking
59. Bowen, supra note 57, at 141-45, 259.
60. Bazelon, supra note 56.
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of the :findings of a former Attorney General's Conference, warned
that the crime problem ·will not be solved until we identify the
social and economic roots of the problem.61 The "man in the street"
may be less impressed by this arduous inquiry than by the FBI
"numbers game," but ascertaining and striking at the roots of the
problem are worth much more than crime statistics--even those
which are worth the paper they are written on.
61. Wechsler, .t.1. Caveat on Crime Control, 27
(1987).
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